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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
plete the writing.14  It is within this rule that oral warranties will
be accepted. 15 However, wherever possible the courts treat the
writing as the sole expression of the transaction as to warranties. 1 6
Yet, in certain circumstances, it has been permitted by parol to
show such warranties,T but these cases must be held to their peculiar
facts.
S. B. S.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-SUPPRESSION OF DEPOSITION-
RULES OF PRACTICE MAY NOT BE INCONSISTENT WITH ANY STATUTE.
-Pursuant to §288 of the Civil Practice Act, appellant had taken by
deposition, testimony of one Loomis, since it appeared, because of
his illness, that he would be unable to attend the trial of the action.
Loomis died before the minutes were transcribed. On respondent's
motion, the deposition was suppressed solely because it had not been
read over and subscribed in accordance with rule 129 of the Rules
of Civil Practice. On appeal, held, reversed. Said rule is invalid as
" Grierson v. Mason, 60 N. Y. 394 (1875); Jameston Bus. College Ass'n
v. Allen, 172 N. Y. 291, 64 N. E. 952 (1902); Cooper v. Payne, 186 N. Y.
334, 78 N. E. 1076 (1906) ; Niles v. Sire, 186 N. Y. 573, 79 N. E. 112 (1906) ;
Studwell v. Bush Co., 206 N. Y. 416, 100 N. E. 129 (1909); DiMenna v.
Cooper & Evand Co., 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N. E. 993 (1917) ; Perry v. Bates, 115
App. Div. 337, 100 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dept. 1906).
"
5 Supra note 13.
"De Witt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 312, 10 Sup. Ct. 536 (1890) ; Seitz v.
Refrigerator Co., 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. 46 (1891) ; Van Winkle v. Crowell,
146 U. S. 42, 13 Sup. Ct. 18 (1892) ; Gardener v. McDonough, 147 Cal. 313,
81 Pac. 964 (1905); Hills v. Farmington, 70 Conn. 450, 39 Atl. 795 (1898);
Maxwell v. Willingham, 101 Ga. 55, 28 S. E. 672 (1897) ; Barrie v. Smith, 105
Ga. 34, 31 S. E. 121 (1898); Bullard v. Brewer, 118 Ga. 918, 45 S. E. 711
(1903) ; Telluride P. T. Co. v. Crane Co., 208 Ill. 218, 70 N. E. 319 (1904) ;
Grubb v. Milan, 249 Ill. 456, 94 N. E. 927 (1911) ; Conant v. Bank, 121 Ind.
324, 22 N. E. 250 (1889) ; Michigan Pipe Co. v. Sullivan Water Co., - Ind.
-, 127 N. E. 768 (1920); Younie v. Walrod, 104 Ia. 475, 73 N. W. 1021
(1898) ; Ehrsam v. Brown, 64 Kan. 466, 67 Pac. 867 (1902) ; Neale v. Ameri-
can E. V. Co., 186 Mass. 303, 71 N. E. 566 (1904) ; Scholl v. Killorian, 190
Mass. 493, 77 N. E. 382 (1906); Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 196 Mass. 440, 82
N. E. 682 (1907) ; Glackin v. Bennett, 226 Mass. 316, 115 N. E. 490 (1917) ;
Bennett v. Thomson, 235 Mass. 463, 126 N. E. 795 (1920) ; McCray R. & C.
S. Co. v. Woods, 99 Mich. 269, 58 N. W. 320 (1894); Zimmerman Mfg. Co.
v. Dolph, 104 Mich. 281, 62 N. W. 339 (1895); Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn.
374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Miller v. Electric Co., 133 Mo. 205, 34 S. W. 585
(1896) ; Gerhardt v. Tucker, 167 Mo. 46, 85 S. W. 552 (1905) ; Quinn v. Moss,
45 Neb. 614, 63 N. W. 931 (1895); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331
(1882); Wilcox v. Cate, 65 Vt. 478, 26 Atl. 1105 (1893); Milwaukee B. Co.
v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 58 N. W. 232 (1894); Case Plow Works v. N. & S.
Co., 90 Wis. 590, 63 N. W. 1013 (1895); Caldwell v. Perkins, 93 Wis. 89,
67 N. W. 29 (1896).
'Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74 (1879); Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y.
288 (1885) ; Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. 961 (1891).
RECENT DECISIONS
being inconsistent with §302 of the Civil Practice Act, and, even if
valid, non-compliance at most constituted mere irregularity which
did not justify court's suppressing cdeposition. Broome County
Farmers' Fire Relief Ass'n v. New York State Electric and Gas
Corp., 239 App. Div. 304, 268 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3rd Dept. 1933).
Where court rules are inconsistent ' or tend to enlarge or abridge
rights 2 conferred by statute it has been repeatedly held that such
rules are invalid. Section 82 of the Judiciary Law authorizes the
Appellate Division to make rules and regulations governing the prac-
tice therein but provides "inter alia" that they may not be inconsistent
with any statute. However, even if a rule is valid, the court, in its
discretion, may overlook or relieve against a violation or non-compli-
ance especially when the rule is deemed directory.3 It is also quite
significant that the Civil Practice Act,4 enacted as a successor to the
Code of Civil Procedure, omitted the clause reading and subscription,
which, under the Code provision, were formerly essential. 5
In the instant case, it is seemingly evident that, although the
court viewed the rule under consideration 6 as imposing a require-
ment additional to statutory requirements for depositions and there-
fore invalid, it primarily based its decision on its discretionary pow-
ers. Rules of practice and procedure are established with a view to
the promotion of justice and should not be given strained and tech-
nical interpretation which will defeat ends of justice and prolong
litigation.7 In reversing the decision, the court remarked that at
most the non-com1l1iance constituted a mere irregularity which did
not justify the lower court suppressing the deposition.8
A. A. M.
IN. Y. JUDICIARY LAW (1909) §82, amended L. 1924, c. 172, §1; Glenney
v. Stedwell, 64 N. Y. 120 (1876); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72,
93 N. E. 192 (1910).
-Ackerman v. Ackerman, supra note 1; Auerbach v. Delaware, L. & W.
R. Co., 66 App. Div. 201, 73 N. Y. Supp. 118 (4th Dept. 1901).
'Martine v. Lowenstein, 68 N. Y. 456 (1877); Evans v. Backer, 101 N. Y.
289, 4 N. E. 516 (1886) ; People v. Tweed, 5 Hun 353 (N. Y. 1875).
IN. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1921) §302, provides inter alia: "Upon every
oral examination, within or without the state, the person or officer before whom
the testimony is taken must take down every question and answer unless the
parties consent or an order directs that only the substance of the testimony be
inserted."
rN. Y. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1848) §808. "The deposition, when
completed, must be carefully read to and subscribed by the person examined."
ON. Y. RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1921) R. 129. "A deposition, when
completed, must be read carefully to the person examined and subscribed by
him."
People v. Tweed, .mpra note 3; Schultze v. Huttlinger, 150 App. Div.
489, 135 N. Y. Supp. 70 (1st Dept. 1926).
" Contra: Instant case. Crapser, J., in dissenting opinion, regards the rule
not as inconsistent but to cover a detail omitted from §302 of the Civil Practice
Act, and, when read together, they contain complete directions for the taking
of testimony by deposition. He states, "The purpose of the provision is to
permit the witness to make any corrections and changes as will make it con-
form to his more deliberate recollection of facts."
